Edged in Stone v.  Northwest Power Systems, LLC Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40463 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-5-2013
Edged in Stone v. Northwest Power Systems, LLC
Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40463
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Edged in Stone v. Northwest Power Systems, LLC Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40463" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
4203.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4203
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
EDGED IN STONE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
NORTHWEST POWER SYSTEMS, LLC, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
CATERPILLAR, INC. and PERKINS 
ENGINES, INC., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-4923-0C 
Docket No. 40463-2012 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock 
Honorable Mitchell Brown, District Judge 
Aaron N. Thompson (ISB#: 4389) 
Bryan N. Henrie (ISB#: 8530) 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Fax: (208) 234-2961 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Reed W. Larsen 
COOPER AND LARSEN, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Fax: (208) 235-1182 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 3 
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIES TO DEFEAT THE DEFENSE 
ASSERTED BY NORTHWEST ................................................................. 3 
1. The Agreement between Northwest and Edged was a Service 
Agreement, Yet Northwest Asserts a Goods Component, Making the 
Statute of Frauds Applicable ....................................................................... 3 
2. There is no Bar through Equitable Estoppel .......................................... 5 
B. WEBB HAD NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND EDGED ............ 6 
C. THERE ARE FACTUAL DISPUTES WHERE NORTHWEST 
REPRESENTS THERE ARE NONE .......................................................... 7 
II. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 9 
APPELLATE BRIEF-PAGE 1 
T ABLE OF CASES At'lD AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495 (1985) .................................................................................. 6 
Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 (1972) ................................................................................. 6 
Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415 (1952) ................................................................................ 7 
Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465 (1975) ..................................... 6 
John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Roselle, 77 Idaho 142 (1955) ............................................. 6 
Killinger v. lest, 91 Idaho 571 (1967) .............................................................................. 7,9 
Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 840 P.2d 1090 (Ct. App. 1992) .......... 5 
Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103 (1953) ............................................................................ 6 
Statutes 
IDAHO CODE § 28-2-201 ...................................................................................................... 4 
APPELLATE BRIEF-PAGE 2 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIES TO DEFEAT THE DEFENSE 
ASSERTED BY NORTHWEST 
1. The Agreement between Northwest and Edged was a Service Agreement, 
Yet Northwest Asserts a Goods Component, Making the Statute of Frauds 
Applicable. 
Northwest seems to misinterpret Edged's argument regarding the Statute of 
Frauds and the scope of the contract pled by Edged in this action. As Northwest points 
out, Edged admitted and pled that the contract in question (the one breached) was one for 
service-inspection of the Skid engine. In its Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, Edged pled as follows: 
66. A contract existed between Edged and Defendant 
Northwest Power ... with terms both express and implied, 
regarding the diagnosis and potential warranty repair and 
service of the Skid. 
67. Defendants breached their contract, both express 
and implied, with Edged through their failure to obtain 
Edged's permission or request for an engine replacement in 
the Skid prior to replacing the Skid's engine, resulting in a 
substantial service bill to Edged. 
68. As a result of Defendants' breach of contract, 
Edged was unable to pay the bill for the engine replacement 
and has suffered significant damages in an amount to be 
proven hereafter at a trial of the issue. 
(R at 46). 
Edged clearly pled a breach of a service contract. Northwest asserts that Edged 
"put forth no evidence in the record disputing that Northwest fulfilled the agreement" and 
that "[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact disputing that Mr. Adams determined 
what was wrong with the engine." Resp't. Br. at 22. As is evident from the underlying 
complaint in the matter, Edged did not plead that Northwest breached the contract by its 
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failure to "determine what was wrong with the engine" but rather through Northwest's 
going beyond the scope of the contract, failing to obtain Edged's permission "for an 
engine replacement in the Skid." Thus, notwithstanding Northwest's assertions that there 
is no dispute regarding a portion of the contract, there is certainly a dispute, with an 
evidentiary basis, regarding Northwest's breach of contract in going beyond the scope of 
the Parties' agreement to Edged's detriment. 
Responding to Edged's contract claim, Northwest raised the defense that Edged, 
through its employee, Webb, contracted to have the Skid engine replaced. In interposing 
this defense, Northwest itself has made the UCC Statute of Frauds applicable, as this 
defense involves the assertion of a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or 
more. In this case, the engine they claim Edged contracted to purchase from Northwest 
was billed to Edged at a price of $3,000 in a total bill of $4,385.18. (R at 104). 
The Statute of Frauds, as applied in Idaho, provides the following: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for 
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is 
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale 
has been made between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized 
agent or broker. 
IDAHO CODE § 28-2-201(1) (emphasis added). 
Given the sale price for the engine of more than $500, Northwest is not entitled to 
present the contract by way of defense unless there is "some writing to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker." IDAHO CODE § 28-2-
201(1) (emphasis added). 
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So, even though the Statute of Frauds does not apply to the underlying (and 
admitted) contract of service for "diagnosis and potential warranty repair and service of 
the Skid," it certainly applies to bar evidence of any alleged contract for sale of the Skid 
engine, absent a writing to indicate the contract was made and signed by Edged. 
2. There is no Bar through Equitable Estoppel. 
Equitable estoppel does not apply here. Northwest asserts that equitable estoppel 
applies "where an agreement is complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or 
contains provisions that are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Resp't. 
Br. at 27. Northwest further asserts that Northwest should be protected against being 
defrauded by Edged, declaring that "a party who is induced to rely on an oral agreement 
and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be defrauded by [one] who 
interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid." Resp't. Br. at 27, citing 
Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Cl. App. 
1992). 
Simply stated, Edged has not interposed the Statute of Frauds to declare its 
agreement with Northwest invalid, thus equitable estoppel does not apply. Edged has 
made it very clear that the agreement for services, including diagnosis of the Skid engine, 
was fulfilled but that Northwest breached the contract by going beyond its terms to install 
a new engine to Edged's detriment. Edged is not attempting to declare the agreement 
invalid. Edged is only using the Statute of Frauds to prevent Northwest from fabrication 
of additional material terms, including the sale from Northwest to Edged of a $3,000 Skid 
engme. 
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B. WEBB HAD NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND EDGED 
Edged would again emphasize that, even if the evidence were to point to apparent 
authority in this case, this Court has held that the "existence or lack of authority of an 
agent is a question of fact." Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 
468 (1975), citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 (1972). Specifically, this Court has held 
that "whether or not there is apparent authority on the agent's part to act as he acted-it is 
a question for the trier of fact to resolve from the evidence." Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 
495,498 (1985), citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho at 12; John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. 
Roselle, 77 Idaho 142, 146 (1955); Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 108 (1953) 
(emphasis in the original). Where there is any reasonable factual dispute as to whether an 
agent, such as Webb, has apparent authority, a ruling as a matter of law is improper, as 
the trier of fact (the jury) is to resolve this dispute. There is such a reasonable factual 
dispute here, as explained in Appellant's Brief. 
Specifically regarding the case law cited by Northwest in support of its position 
on apparent authority, Idaho Title Company v. American States Insurance Company 
repeats the law that "apparent authority of an agent cannot be created by the acts or 
statements of the agent alone," while specifically finding that "American States had the 
duty of using reasonable diligence to ascertain if Idaho Title and its employee Turner had 
authority to request cancellation." 96 Idaho 465, 468 (1975). In the instant case, 
Northwest very candidly admits, when asked if Webb ever indicated that he had authority 
to deal with Northwest directly in making these decisions, that Adams "had no way of 
knowing if that was true or not" and that he had done nothing in terms of "reasonable 
diligence" beyond assuming "he was dealing with a standup company." (Dep. of Mark 
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Adams at 25, 11. 17-24, taken 512312012, augmented 3/15/2013). This cannot be found to 
be "reasonable diligence." Even if the District Court believed this to be "reasonable 
diligence," this is a question for the trier of fact, the jury. 
Killinger v. lest stands, in part, for the proposition that the "declarations of an 
alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove the grant of power exercised by 
him and to bind his principal to third parties," further finding that "[t]he statements by the 
alleged agent, as to the scope of his authority, are admissible if, at the time the statements 
are offered in evidence, the existence of the agency has been proven by independent 
evidence." 91 Idaho 571, 575 (1967). Here, Northwest has built its case almost 
exclusively on the "statements [of] the alleged agent," Webb, before any independent 
evidence showing the existence of the agency have been proven. Northwest's case for 
Webb receiving the bid, transmitting it to Preston (Edged) and indicating to Northwest 
that Edged accepted the bid and wished to have the engine replaced are based exclusively 
on testimony from Webb without any independent evidence. However, even where there 
are "other corroborative facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence, agency then 
becomes a fact question for the jury." Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415,430 (1952). Thus, 
even were Webb's statements somehow corroborated, the grant of summary judgment 
and taking this determination away from the jury is improper. 
C. THERE ARE FACTUAL DISPUTES WHERE NORTHWEST 
REPRESENTS THERE ARE NONE 
Edged disputes that it authorized Adams to replace the engine. First, Webb was 
not authorized to deal with Northwest. (R at 152, 172, pp. 115, 194, 11. 17-22, 13-15). 
Second, Edged did not want Northwest to replace the engine. (R at 43, <]I 32; R at 157, pp. 
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132, 133, 11. 20-25, 1-15). If Northwest and Adams had infonned Edged of the non-
warranty nature of the engine replacement, Edged would have had the engine rebuilt by 
its in-house mechanic at a substantial savings. [d. 
In addition, Northwest states more than once that both Webb and Adams testified 
that Webb informed Preston of the dusting, that it was not covered under warranty and it 
needed to be replaced, but this is unsubstantiated by Adams's deposition testimony other 
than through hearsay statements regarding prior statements made by Webb. (R at 505, p. 
26,11. 7-11). 
To respond to some representations made by Northwest that are not accurate, 
Northwest represents that "[t]here was no daily maintenance of the Skid." Resp't. Br. at 
22. However, there was in fact daily maintenance of the Skid, or at least such is in 
contention. (R at 147-148, 200, pp. 93,95, 98, 11. 19-20, 17-23, 8-17). This fact does 
little to resolve the legal dispute before the Court, but Appellant desired to clear the air on 
this issue. 
Furthermore, Northwest makes it appear, through its briefing, that it was willing 
to release the Skid to Edged and that Edged simply failed to get the Skid. Resp't. Br. at 9. 
This account of the facts leaves out the important detail that, once Northwest took out the 
replaced engine and told Edged to come get the Skid, Northwest insisted on payment for 
its labor in replacing and removing the engine before the Skid would be released. (Dep. 
of Mark Adams at 44, 45, 11. 18-25, 1, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Due to 
Edged's inability to pay the bill, Edged was unable to pick up the Skid. (R at 43, <]I 37). 
Northwest states in its briefing that "Mr. George admitted he knew there was no 
warranty from Northwest on the engine," and goes on to hammer this point home. Resp't. 
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Br. at 7. This argument is out of place in Northwest's briefing because the issue of breach 
of warranty was voluntarily dismissed, has not been appealed and is no longer at issue. 
To address Northwest's concerns regarding Mr. Adam's deposition being 
"augmented," Edged does not suggest that his deposition testimony was augmented or 
changed, but rather is following proper procedure in indicating to this Court the date on 
which the deposition of Mr. Adams was augmented into the record on appeal-the 15th 
day of March, 2013. This is regular practice and is in no way intended to cast aspersions 
on Northwest's practices or Mr. Adams's testimony in those particular instances. 
Finally, Northwest responds to Edged's statements regarding Edged's potential 
lawsuit against Mr. Webb by stating that this position is "unfounded." Resp't. Br. at 21. 
Through reference to a potential lawsuit, Edged wishes to show that Mr. Webb has a 
personal interest in testifying in a manner consistent with his actual testimony. A quick 
look at Idaho Supreme Court precedent shows that Mr. Webb is at least in danger of a 
potential lawsuit from Northwest itself. In Killinger v. lest, the Court reasoned that a 
"party entering into a contract in his self-assured capacity as agent, with no actual 
authority from the purported principal, or in excess of an existing authority, is personally 
liable to the other contracting party who acted in good faith and in reliance on the false 
representation." 91 Idaho 571, 576 (1967). Mr. Webb had every incentive to color and 
shade his testimony to shield himself from liability, so Edged's position regarding a 
"potential lawsuit" is not wholly "unfounded." 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the record and pleadings filed in this case, Appellant has met its 
minimal burden of producing facts that demonstrate material disputes of fact as to each 
APPELLATE BRIEF-PAGE 9 
challenged element of his claims. As such, the District Court's decision is in error, and 
must be reversed so that the issue of apparent authority make be determined by the trier 
of fact-the jury Edged has demanded. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
~5Lt--~--
BRYMf~~---·"'""'" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was 
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown an in the matter indicated. 
Reed W. Larsen 
COOPER AND LARSEN, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
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